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Abstract - Web browsers are essential tools for accessing the Internet. Extra 
complexities are added to forensic investigations when recovering browsing 
artefacts as portable and private browsing are now common and available in 
popular web browsers. Browsers claim that whilst operating in private mode, no 
data is stored on the system. This paper investigates whether the claims of web 
browsers discretion are true by analysing the remnants of browsing left by the latest 
versions of Internet Explorer, Chrome, Firefox, and Opera when used in a private 
browsing session, as a portable browser, and when the former is running in private 
mode. Some of our key findings show how forensic analysis of the file system 
recovers evidence from IE while running in private mode whereas other browsers 
seem to maintain better user privacy. We analyse volatile memory and demonstrate 
how physical memory by means of dump files, hibernate and page files are the key 
areas where evidence from all browsers will still be recoverable despite their mode 
or location they run from. 
Keywords - Web browser forensics; Portable applications; Private Browsing; Incognito 
mode; Physical Memory; Windows; IE; Chrome; Firefox; Opera; OSForensics 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Web browser applications are an essential tool for accessing websites via the Internet. 
The web browser enables users to search for information, read emails, communicate via 
instant messaging or social networks, use Internet banking and shop via e-commerce 
websites (Dharan and Meeran, 2014). Forensic artefacts left by a browser after a session 
include, but are not limited to cache, history, cookies, and file download lists. When 
conducting a digital investigation on a system, an investigator can gather evidence from 
such artefacts. This evidence can divulge the websites that a user visited, the time and 
frequency of access, and also search engine keywords that were used (Oh et al., 2011). 
 
The Apple Safari web browser introduced a feature known as ‘Private browsing’ 
in 2005 which prevented the web browser from leaving traces of browsing history, 
temporary files, form data, usernames, passwords and cookies on a system (Satvat et al., 
2014). To date, all other popular web browsers now include this feature. In Mozilla 
Firefox the feature is known as ‘Private Browsing’ (Mozilla Foundation, 2014). In 
Chrome it is known as ‘Incognito mode’ (Google, 2014). In IE it is known as ‘InPrivate 
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Browsing’ (Microsoft, 2014). When launching these browsers in private mode they all 
claim to maintain user privacy by not keeping any traces of web surfing sessions such as 
visited websites, search history, download history, web form history, cookies, or any 
temporary Internet files. 
 
 Portable application versions of popular desktop software are now becoming 
increasingly popular allowing users’ access to their favourite applications on systems that 
they do not have administrative rights to. These portable applications are becoming even 
more common due to their fast execution times and ability to run without being installed 
(Marrington et al., 2012). Portable applications also add an additional layer of security 
due to their data being stored on and accessed from the external device that they are run 
from. Web browsers are an example of a popular portable application. Not only does a 
portable web browser allow users to carry around their favourite browser and website 
bookmarks with them on a tiny USB stick, but it also adds the ability to surf the Internet 
anonymously from any device with enabled USB ports. There is therefore a requirement 
to analyse the impact of these new browser features on digital investigations to secure 
evidence. In contrast to the objective of maintaining user privacy, the perspective of 
digital forensics and incident response is that digital evidence is needed to identify a 
threat, malicious perpetrator or ascertain whether a user has actually been falsely framed 
to take the responsibility of breaking cyber laws and legislations. Jahankhani (2007) 
reviews cyber legislations and their impact on the society. 
 
Data from W3Counter.com (2014) show the popularity of different browsers 
over time. Statistics show a steep decline in the number of Internet users operating 
Microsoft Internet Explorer (IE) from 67.6% in May 2007 to 21.2% in July 2014. Google 
Chrome, however, has rapidly grown in popularity from its introduction in September 
2008. It now dominates the web browser market share at 38.5%. As Chrome, IE, Firefox 
and Opera are shown to be the most popular Windows-based browsers at present, this 
paper will concentrate on analysing forensic methods used for recovering evidence which 
may have been viewed using these browsers in both private and portable modes. The 
latest versions of these browsers will be used so as to provide an update to previous 
studies and discover whether web browsers’ claims of not storing data about private 
browsing sessions are now true. 
 
When web browsers are used, they store artefacts relevant to the user activity 
such as images in temporary locations on the hard disk while the physical memory also 
caches processed data to speed the functionality of the software. New file versions 
automatically replace existing local ones while users can configure the software to delete 
these temporary files once active sessions are terminated. Likewise, Cookies are special 
type of temporary files placed and utilised by external websites to store information about 
the user or his computer for future use e.g. to recall login details or user preferences (Oh 
et al., 2011). To store and organise browsing data, self-contained, serverless and zero 
configuration rational database management systems such as SQLite are utilised (Pereira, 
2009). Unlike client-server models, this approach requires no standalone process, instead 
the library is integrated as part of the browser. Similar concept is applied in the .dat 
files used by IE, as it works as a repository of redundant information (e.g. URLs, search 
queries etc). IE used the  index.dat database file until v10, then used the Extensible 
Strage Engine (ESE) WebCacheV01.dat afterwords (Chivers, 2014). These files can 
not be deleted easily because they are always open when Windows is running which 
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makes them of significant value for digital investigations. File format could vary between 
browsers, so while data is saved as binary in index.dat, ASCII was used in the old 
history.dat within Firefox. Generally speaking, a URL is cached when visited, if 
there is no local copy of the page, new files are download and cached on the hard drive. 
Each file is then assigned a unique name (e.g. alphabetical value) inside the.dat file to 
the actual filename stored on the hard disk. However, the internal structure of such 
databases is not necessarily known (when not published by the developers as in IE) but 
certain facts are recovered through forensic investigations.  
 
 The remaining parts of this paper are organised as follows: Section II review 
existing literature. Section III details the test-bed and methodology used during the 
experiments and the browsing modes that will be investigated. Section IV identifies the 
locations that browsers in normal, private, portable and portable private modes store files 
when in use. Section V analyses the locations noted in section III to discover the artefacts 
that can be recovered after browser sessions in the various modes. Section VI discusses 
the findings with the conclusions stated in Section VII. 
 
II. RELATED STUDIES 
 
Pereira (2009) examined how SQLite databases are used in Firefox and found that 
records can be recovered after they have been deleted by the user because SQLite utilises 
unallocated disk space to support transactions. Said et al. (2011) analysed artefacts from 
different browsers running in private mode and demonstrated how Google Chrome is 
relatively more secure although evidence is still recoverable from memory. Eleutério and 
Eleutério (2011) took a different approach and conducted an experiment to argue that the 
implementation of web applications has a considerable effect on the investigator’s ability 
to recover artefacts. 
 
Several studies have examined the true extent of privacy that ‘Private browsing’ and 
portable browsers actually provide. Chivers (2013) examined the use of IE10’s InPrivate 
browsing feature to discover what evidence could be recovered. He found that IE10 
maintains a database of history records and cache in the WebCacheV01.dat file. 
InPrivate browsing records were stored in the same tables as normal browsing records 
and then removed when the browser was closed. He also found evidence in log files that 
were not removed until IE10 was re-opened. InPrivate browsing records were identified 
in pagefile.sys and the system volume information directory. He claimed that over 
80% of evidence on browsing history was recoverable from non-database areas.  
 
 Satvat et al. (2014) examined the remains left by Firefox 19.0, Safari 5.1.7, 
Chrome 25.0.1364.97 and IE 10.0.9200.16521. They observed that when Firefox was 
cleanly closed, evidence from private browsing sessions could not be found in its 
database, however, if the browser was not cleanly terminated, evidence could be 
recovered until the browser was re-opened. The authors highlighted that evidence was 
leaked due to extensions being used in private mode and developed their own extensions 
to prove that vulnerabilities exist. The authors compared bookmarks added in private 
mode versus those added in normal mode and noted that it was possible to identify the 
usage of private mode through these records. Other useful information was contained in 
DNS cache artefacts left in RAM and cookie timings. 
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Marrington et al. (2012) conducted research to determine whether Chrome 
portable left similar forensic artefacts to the installed version. They compared the 
footprints left by both the installed version, portable version and portable version in 
incognito mode on a Windows XP SP3 system. During these three scenarios the authors 
watched YouTube videos, searched for images via Google image search and browsed for 
items on eBay. After examining forensic images of all scenarios, the authors identified 
traces of browsing history in all images. In the case of the portable sessions, however, the 
results were mostly found in unallocated space or the page file. They identified many 
results in the user’s local settings/temp directory during the normal Chrome 
portable browsing session indicating that the browser was storing files on the hard disk 
rather than the USB stick. Evidence from the Incognito portable browsing session was 
only found in pagefile.sys. From these results, they concluded that there was no 
significant difference between using the installed or portable version of Chrome in 
normal browsing mode as both versions left evidence that could be easily recovered from 
the hard disk via conventional digital forensic methods. 
 
 Ohana and Shashidhar (2013) investigated the artefacts left by private and 
portable browsers. They studied IE, Chrome, Firefox and Safari by searching on Google 
and Yahoo, viewing YouTube videos, sending email with attachments via Gmail, 
Hotmail, Yahoo! Mail and SHSU mail, logging in to online banking, attempting to 
purchase ammunitions and searching for suspected stolen items on Craigslist. From these 
experiments they discovered that portable and private browsing do leave artefacts on 
systems, however, the number of artefacts left depends on the browser used. IE left the 
most artefacts, although not in the typical locations. With other browsers, RAM appeared 
to be the best place to obtain evidence. Chrome Portable proved to leave the most 
artefacts on the host machine. 
 
There have also been few attempts to extract and analyse specific artefacts related to web 
browsers. For instance, Matsumoto and Sakurai (2014) have scoped their work on the 
acquisition of WebStorage data from memory dumps. WebStorage is a method used to 
store data in a web browser locally, it comes as part of HTML5 as a new coming 
alternative to cookies. 
 
III. METHODOLOGY AND TEST-BED SETUP 
 
A. Instruments 
 
To investigate the artefacts that portable and private browsers left on a system, VMWare 
virtual machines running Windows 7 SP1 with 1GB of RAM were built. To perform 
browsing sessions, the latest supported major official releases of web browsers were 
installed: IE11.0.9600.17207, Firefox 36.0, Chrome 41.0.2272 and Opera 28. Opera 
Portable version 12.17 was, however, the latest portable version of the web browser 
available at the time of the experiment. 
 
 To determine the storage locations of the artefacts and those changed during 
browsing, OSForensics (PassMark, 2014) was installed. OSForensics allows for file 
snapshots to be captured and then compared to analyse and show which files were 
created, modified and deleted. FTK Imager (AccessData, 2014) was used on the host 
system to mount the virtual disks and take forensic images of file systems and physical 
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memory (volatile memory). Additionally, tools such as Hex Workshop from BreakPoint 
Software (2014), Bulk_Extractor (Garfinkel, 2013) and Volatility from Volatility 
Foundation (2014) were essential to analyse and recover data from memory dumps. 
 
B. Experiments 
 
 The VM was cloned so as to use a clean system each time and then the 
following tests run for the experiments. During each trial, we attempted to imitate the 
behaviour of end users, the web browser was used to navigate to 
http://www.youtube.com and watch a video, navigate to http://news.bbc.co.uk and open 
two news articles, navigate to http://images.google.com and search for “meerkat” then 
click to view two images. These actions were performed on Internet Explorer InPrivate, 
Firefox Private, Opera Private, Chrome Incognito, Firefox Portable, Opera Portable, 
Chrome Portable, Firefox Portable Private, Opera Portable Private, and Chrome Portable 
Incognito. Forensic images for the file system and memory were taken, and a copy of the 
pagefile.sys was exported, prior and after each browsing session. Further reflections on 
each experiment are shared with analysis provided in sections IV and V. 
 
IV. LOCATING BROWSER ARTEFACTS 
 
A. Locating artefacts after normal browsing 
 
To determine a baseline for tests and discover areas to investigate for files during private 
and portable browsing, the tests were first run in normal browsing mode. Locations of 
browser artefacts were noted with any files covered in our analysis. Tables 1 to 4 show 
the locations of these relevant artefacts. 
 
Table 1. Default locations of IE artefacts in Windows 7 
Artefact Location within C:\Users\{user}\AppData\Local\Microsoft 
History …\Windows\History\ 
Cache …\Windows\WebCache\ 
…\Windows\Temp…Files\Content.IE5\ 
…\Windows\Temp…Files\Low\Content.IE5\ 
Recovery …\Internet Explorer\Recovery 
Downloads …\Windows\Temp… Files\Content.IE5\ 
 Location within C:\Users\{user}\AppData\ 
Digital Cert. …LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\ 
…LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\ 
Cookies …\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Cookies\ 
…\LocalLow\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\DOMStore\ 
Bookmarks C:\Users\{user}\Favorites 
 
 
Table 2. Default locations of Firefox artefacts in Windows 7 
Artefact  
 Location within 
C:\Users\{user}\AppData\Local\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles 
Cache …\<randomtext>.default\Cache 
…\<randomtext>.default\jumpListCache 
 Location within 
C:\Users\{user}\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles 
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Cookies …\ngn1mdm2.default\cookies.sqlite 
History & Bookmarks …\<randomtext>.default\places.sqlite 
Digital Cert. …\<randomtext>.default\cert8.db 
Session Store …\<randomtext>.default 
Downloads …\<randomtext>.default\downloads.sqlite 
 
Table 3. Default locations of Chrome artefacts in Windows 7 
Type of File Location within C:\Users\{user}\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User 
Data\Default 
History …\History 
…\History-journal 
Cookies …\Cookies 
…\Cookies-journal 
Cache …\Cache\; …\Favicons; …\Favicons-journal 
Login Passwords …\Web Data; …\Web Data-journal 
Bookmarks …\Bookmarks 
 
Table 4. Default locations of Opera artefacts in Windows 7 
Artefact Location within C:\Users\{user}\AppData 
Main data directory …\Roaming\Opera\Opera\ 
Cache …\Local\Opera\Opera\cache\ 
 
 
B. Locating artefacts during and after private browsing  
 
Each browser was tested during private browsing. The locations noted in section A were 
monitored to capture potential artefact locations. 
 
IE 11 
 
During private browsing, IE created .dat files in the Recovery directory like during 
normal browsing mode in order to give users the ability to recover sessions after crashes. 
It also heavily utilised the Low\Content.IE5\ directory to cache files during 
InPrivate browsing.  
  
Existing .log files in the WebCache folder were removed and new logs 
created in the same directory for the current session. In private mode, the browser still 
utilised the CryptnetUrlCache\Content\ directory to store certificates. When the 
browser was then closed, IE performed a clean-up task. It removed the files in the 
Recovery directory and deleted files it had cached at Low\Content.IE5\. Some of 
the WebCache log files were deleted, but not all, which left V0100010.log through 
to V0100017.log available for further analysis along with WebCacheV01.dat and 
V01.log. These files are not removed until IE is re-opened. 
  
Figure 1 shows the files stored on the hard drive during IE InPrivate mode. 
These files can be matched to the websites being visited.  
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Figure 1. Comparing snapshots taken when IE was open and closed shows that files cached were 
deleted when IE restarted. However, investigation also shows that files are stored on the hard drive 
during IE InPrivate mode. These files can be matched to the websites being visited. 
Firefox 
 
During private browsing, there was very little hard drive activity from Firefox. Files were 
not cached, however, Firefox did store .sqlite-wal (Write Ahead Logging files for 
the SQLite databases) on the hard drive. Once Firefox was closed, a clean-up operation 
was observed. The .sqlite-wal and .sqlite-shm files were deleted from the 
drive and .sqlite files were modified. _CACHE_001_, _CACHE_002_, 
_CACHE_003_, and _CACHE_MAP_ were then modified. These files contain 
information to manage the Firefox cache and hold metadata (Ritchie, 2014). 
 
Chrome 
 
While using Chrome Incognito browsing there was a considerable amount of hard drive 
activity, however, very little of this was for cached files. The majority of this activity was 
in the extensions directory related to default Chrome extensions; 
 …\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User_Data\Default\Extensions  
  
There were many other files created and modified under the User Data folder 
including Chrome database files. 
 
Opera 
 
There was very little hard drive activity whilst Opera was used in private mode. In the 
directory located in  
…\Roaming\Opera Software\Opera Stable\ 
The database file Visited Links was modified as was Preferences and 
History. data_0 and data_1 were also modified, located in 
…\Local\Opera Software\Opera Stable\Cache\ 
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C. Locating artefacts during and after browsing in portable browsers  
 
Firefox 
 
Firefox portable did not store files on the hard drive whilst in use. Instead, all sqlite 
databases and other files were stored on the USB stick at 
\FirefoxPortable\Data\profile\. By default, the cache in Firefox portable is 
set to 0MB therefore no cache files are created. If it were enabled, Firefox Portable would 
store the files at \FirefoxPortable\Data\profile\ and not on the hard drive. 
 
Chrome 
 
Google Chrome portable stored cache files on the hard drive rather than the USB stick. 
At C:\Users\{user}\AppData\Local\Temp\ a folder named 
GoogleChromePortable was created with the cache folder inside populated with the 
files whilst Chrome portable was in use. 
 
 These files were still in place when Chrome Portable was closed, but removed 
when the USB stick was ejected. Other common Chrome browser files (e.g. Database 
files) were not found on the hard drive, but on the USB stick instead. 
 
Opera 
 
Opera portable didn’t use the hard disk to store files. The USB stick that it was running 
from showed considerable file activity. Cache folders and databases were held on the 
USB stick at \OperaPortable\Data\Profile. 
 
D. Locating artefacts during and after private browsing in portable browsers 
 
Firefox 
 
The portable version of Firefox stored very few artefacts on the hard disk during private 
browsing. Instead, it used the USB stick to store sqlite databases and other files. 
There are considerably fewer files created when in portable private browsing in 
comparison with portable normal browsing. 
 
Chrome 
 
In portable Incognito mode, Chrome did not store files on the hard disk, unlike when 
used in normal mode. There were also very few files stored on the USB stick. 
 
Opera 
 
In portable private mode, Opera did not utilise the hard disk to store files. Instead the 
USB stick was heavily utilised to store files related to the browsing session. Once the 
web browser is closed, however, a clean-up job appears to run which deleted and 
modified files that were written while the browser was in use.  
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V. RECOVERING EVIDENCE OF BROWSING HISTORY FROM 
ARTEFACTS 
 
The artefacts gathered in Section IV were analysed and examined for activity of the 
known browser history in each session. There were several notable artefacts discovered 
in the forensic images of user profiles that we discuss and analyse further. 
 
A. Notable Artefacts 
 
IE Web cache directory 
 
Until version 10, IE used the index.dat database file as a repository for history, 
cookies and temporary files (Satvat et al., 2014). From version 10 an ESE (Extensible 
Storage Engine) database, WebCacheV01.dat, is used to maintain history, cache and 
cookies (Chivers, 2013). This directory also contains the files V01.log (Transaction log 
file), V01.chk (checkpoint file), and V01xxxx.log. 
 
 Whilst the operating system is in use it is not possible to copy 
WebCacheV01.dat. In the   
…\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\ folder the WebCacheLock.dat file 
resides, indicating that the database is locked. After a forensic image is taken, the 
contents of WebCache can be analysed further. 
 
 The esentutl.exe tool, built into Windows, provides utilities for ESE 
databases, such as WebCacheV01.dat. According to Chivers (2013), when copied 
from a system, this file will most often be marked as dirty, i.e. requiring that the logs be 
flushed to the database. The esentutl.exe provides a command to check the state of 
a WebCacheV01.dat file: 
 
> esentutl /mh WebCacheV01.dat 
 
 Running this on the file extracted after the IE11 private browsing session shows 
a dirty shutdown state. To flush the log files extracted with the database, 
esentutl.exe provides a recovery command to flush the log files in the current 
directory to the database: 
 
> esentutl /r V01 /d 
 
 When the database state is checked again, it shows as being clean. This places 
the file in a state ready for analysis. 
 
$I30 Files 
 
On NTFS file systems, folder and directory information is stored separately from file 
inode data. The $I30 files store this information (Philipp, et al., 2010). Even if the 
original files have been moved or deleted, the $I30 file may still contain entries which 
reveal file names and access times. INDXParse.py (Ballenthin, 2014) is a Python script 
created to extract data from $I30 files to a csv file. 
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B. Internet Explorer 11 in InPrivate browsing mode 
 
Artefacts for analysis after IE11 was tested in InPrivate browsing mode were: A memory 
dump, pagefile.sys, a forensic image of the user profile, the webcache folder and 
$I30 files in the webcache and Content.IE5/Low folders. 
 
IE11 Webcache 
 
After WebCacheV01.dat was placed in a clean state using esentutl.ese it was 
opened in a Hex editor and searched for evidence of the private web browsing session. 
Evidence of the top level domains visited during InPrivate browsing could be located in 
the database, however, search terms were not. Evidence of bbc.co.uk, google.com and 
youtube.com were all found. 
 
$I30 files 
 
On examining the \Content.IE5\ folder from the image taken of the user profile, a 
$I30 file of more than zero bytes was found in two of the cache folders: JHNO3QUG and 
XKCEAG9T.  
 
 Evidence in these files showed timestamps of web browsing and some filenames 
of the files created during the browsing session. The extract of the $I30 file from the 
JHNO3QUG cache folder revealed the files that were returned during the Google image 
search. The word meerkat was detected twice in filenames as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. $I30 files in the IE cache folders reveal filenames to help identify search history after the 
cache was cleared. 
 
Page file and Memory Dump 
 
Both pagefile.sys and a live memory dump were taken from the system after IE 
was closed. Pagefile.sys showed no evidence, however, this would have partially 
been due to the system having a large amount of RAM available and not swapping to the 
page file. 
 
The less common searches of meerkat and bbc.co.uk were found many times 
throughout memory showing that it is possible to find private search history in live 
memory. With URL matches for bbc.co.uk there was also HTML for the pages that had 
been viewed making it possible to further analyse the actual pages that had been 
accessed. 
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User profile Deleted files 
 
The ‘Deleted Files’ function of OSForensics was used to automatically detect and display 
the deleted files which were automatically discovered in the forensic image of the user 
profile. Several images of Meerkats were discovered. 
 
C. Mozilla Firefox in private browsing mode 
 
Artefacts for analysis after Firefox was tested in private mode were 
\CACHE\_CACHE_001_, _CACHE_002_, _CACHE_003_, _CACHE_MAP_, 
pagefile.sys and the live memory dump. 
 
 Firefox stored very little on disk whilst in private mode. The only remnants were 
the _cache_map_ files. These were parsed using Firefox Cache Forensics parser 
(Ritchie, 2014).  The only website that this showed data for was 
http://clients1.google.com/ocsp.  
 
 Pagefile.sys and the memory dump were scanned for the search terms. 
meerkat was detected in four places, however, bbc.co.uk was not. Youtube and 
google.com were detected many times. 
 
D. Google Chrome in incognito browsing mode 
 
Artefacts for analysis after using Chrome Incognito mode revealed no artefacts on the 
system hard drive. Therefore only the live memory dump and pagefile.sys were 
available for analysis. Live memory provided many matches when searched as shown in 
Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. After Chrome was used in Incognito mode, many artefacts could be detected in the 
memory dump 
 
E. Opera in private browsing mode 
 
Although there was some hard disk activity when Opera was used in private browsing 
mode, the files examined contained no evidence of the browsing session. Live memory 
contained evidence of the browsing. 
 
 Artefacts extracted from these different browsers running in private mode are 
compared in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Useful artefacts located from different browsers running in private mode 
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IE11 meerkat 0 2 0 23 11 
Memory dump, 
WebCacheV01.dat + logs, $I30 in 
cache folders, Deleted files in 
cache folders 
youtube 30 0 10 100+ 0 
bbc.co.uk 3 0 0 92 0 
google.com/search 0 0 0 0 0 
google.com 11 0 66+ 100+ 0 
Firefox  meerkat 0 0 0 4 0 
Memory dump 
youtube 0 0 10 67 0 
bbc.co.uk 0 0 0 0 0 
google.com/search 0 0 0 6 0 
google.com 0 0 100+ 100+ 0 
Chrome meerkat 0 0 0 3 0 
Memory dump 
youtube 0 0 10 100+ 0 
bbc.co.uk 0 0 0 87 0 
google.com/search 0 0 0 22 0 
google.com 0 0 100+ 100+ 0 
Opera meerkat 0 0 0 3 0 Memory dump 
youtube 0 0 2 17 0 
bbc.co.uk 0 0 0 57 0 
google.com/search 0 0 0 1 0 
google.com 0 0 100+ 100+ 0 
 
 
F. Mozilla Firefox portable in normal browsing mode 
 
Although there is very little evidence available on the hard drive after browsing in normal 
mode on portable Firefox, many files were created on the USB stick that it was run from:  
cert8.db, places.sqlite, jumpListCache content-prefs.sqlite, 
healthreport.sqlite, permissions.sqlite, webappsstore.sqlite, 
cookies.sqlite, folder and thumbnails folder.  
These were available for analysis along with pagefile.sys and the live memory 
dump. 
 
 The cookies.sqlite file reveals some useful information about sites that 
were visited in a portable browsing session. Youtube.com, google.com and bbc.co.uk all 
had cookies stored for them. Nationalgeographic.com and scorecardresearch.com were 
not visited, however, were recorded in the moz_cookies table, presumably because 
one of the other sites linked to them. permissions.sqlite showed an entry for the 
ssl settings for ssl.bbc.co.uk. Analysis of places.sqlite showed several entries of 
sites visited across the different tables with the moz_places table holding the most 
data including the URL and title of the page that had been visited. Image artefacts were 
found in the jumpListCache as well as the thumbnails folder which could be 
matched to browsing history. 
 
G. Chrome portable in normal browsing mode  
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Chrome utilised the /Local/Temp/GoogleChromePortable folder for storing 
cache, however, files were removed once the USB stick was removed. The USB stick 
held many artefacts related to the portable browsing session under the  
GoogleChromePortable/Data/Profile folder. The history database file held 
the URLs of sites that were visited in the segments and urls tables. Like with the 
moz_places table in Firefox’s places.sqlite database, the full URL and titles 
could be located. Artefacts were also found in the omni_box_shortcuts table of the 
shortcuts database and the cookies table of the cookies database.  
 
H. Opera portable in normal browsing mode 
 
After normal browsing using Opera portable, no relevant files were discovered on the 
hard disk, however, several files placed on the USB stick during normal browsing using 
Opera Portable contained evidence of browsing history. The vps (Visited Pages Search) 
files contained in the OperaPortable\Data\profile\vps\0000 directory. The 
OperaPortable\Data\Sessions directory contained autosave and temporary data 
of preferences for the sessions. These files include sections labelled ‘history url’ and 
‘history title’ which store URLs visited in the sessions. Data was also located in the 
opssl6.dat certificate store, typed_history.xml file, cookies4.dat file and 
global_history.dat file. A considerable amount of evidence of websites visited 
during the browsing session was obtained from these files. 
 
Table 6 compares artefacts founds from the different portable browsers running 
in normal mode. 
 
Table 6. Useful artefacts located from different portable browsers running in normal mode. The 
asterisk (*) indicates that artefacts were found on the USB stick, not hard drive. 
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Firefox meerkat 0 0 0 46 11* Memory dump,  
cookies.sqlite*, 
permissions.sqlite*, places.sqlite*, 
Thumbnails folder*, 
jumpListCache folder* 
youtube 0 0 5 23 8* 
bbc.co.uk 0 0 0 250 19* 
google.com/search 0 0 0 9 11* 
google.com 0 0 100+ 80 28* 
Chrome  meerkat 0 0 0 55 7* 
Memory dump, history*, 
shortcuts*, cookies* 
youtube 0 0 4 100+ 9* 
bbc.co.uk 0 0 0 161 13* 
google.com/search 0 0 0 0 7* 
google.com 0 0 100+ 100+ 15* 
Opera meerkat 0 0 0 200+ 39* Memory dump, md.dat*, 
autosave.win*, opr91C3/tmp*, 
opr773D.tmp*, 
global_history.dat*, cookies4.dat*, 
opssl6.dat*, typed_history.xml* 
youtube 0 0 3 100+ 36* 
bbc.co.uk 0 0 0 200+ 17* 
google.com/search 0 0 0 54 7 
google.com 0 0 100+ 200+ 23* 
 
 
I. Firefox portable in private browsing mode 
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After the Firefox portable private browsing, no artefacts remained on the USB stick or 
the hard disk. The only evidence found was in the moz_cookies table of the cookies 
database, however, it is likely that as this entry is for google.com the entry was created by 
default. The live memory dump, however, did reveal evidence of search history. 
 
J. Chrome portable in incognito browsing mode  
 
Chrome portable incognito browsing did not leave artefacts on the USB stick or hard 
disk. The only match for the browsing history was the URL: 
http://www.google.com/favicon.ico in the favicons table of the favicons database. This is 
possibly because this is a default homepage rather than a link to browsing history. Again, 
the live memory dump provided matches for all browser history. 
 
K. Opera portable in private browsing mode 
 
Only one artefact was recovered from the USB stick that Opera portable was run from in 
private mode, opssl6.dat. This certificate store listed ssl.bbc.co.uk. Additional 
evidence of the browsing session was only found in the live memory dump.  
 
Table 7 compares artefacts founds from the different portable browsers running in private 
mode. 
 
Table 7. Useful artefacts located from different portable browsers running in private mode. The 
asterisk (*) indicates that artefacts were found on the USB stick, not hard drive. 
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Firefox meerkat 0 0 0 0 0 
Memory dump, cookies.sqlite* 
youtube 0 0 5 41 0 
bbc.co.uk 0 0 0 118 0 
google.com/search 0 0 0 0 0 
google.com 0 0 100+ 100+ 1* 
Chrome  meerkat 0 0 0 54 0 
Memory dump, favicons* 
youtube 0 0 5 100+ 0 
bbc.co.uk 0 0 0 39 0 
google.com/search 0 0 0 32 0 
google.com 0 0 100+ 100+ 2* 
Opera 
 
meerkat 0 0 0 2 0 
Memory dump, opssl6.dat* 
youtube 0 0 2 100+ 0 
bbc.co.uk 0 0 0 14 1 
google.com/search 0 0 0 1 0 
google.com 0 0 100+ 100+ 0 
 
 
 
VI. DISCUSSION 
 
The results show that evidence was still recoverable during portable and private browsing 
sessions, although the amount of evidence varied depending on the browser used. Even 
during InPrivate browsing, IE left a considerable number of artefacts on the hard drive in 
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the same locations used during normal browsing. Using forensic techniques it was 
possible to recover cache files that the browser had deleted. The WebCacheV01.dat 
file was recoverable from the hard drive, as long as IE had not been re-opened. Therefore, 
it is possible for artefacts from the previous web browsing session to be recovered from 
this file during a forensic investigation, however, older evidence may not be obtainable. 
Evidence of cached file names was recoverable from $I30 files in cache folders during 
forensic recovery as well. 
 
 Chrome portable stored cache files on the hard disk during normal browsing 
rather than on the USB stick that it was run from. Although in these experiments it was 
not possible to recover these files after they had been deleted, they may be recoverable in 
other circumstances. Unlike Chrome portable, Firefox portable and Opera portabledid not 
store any files on the hard disk so artefacts could not be recovered. In private browsing 
modes, both Firefox, Chrome, and Opera Portable did not store any artefacts on the hard 
drive.   
 
Windows terminology labels the different parts of memory as available, free or 
cached. It is the cached space that is most relevant to us because this is where data for the 
most recently accessed files reside. To boost performance, application cached data will 
remain even after they are closed which explains the wealth of evidence recovered from 
the live memory dumps in each of our experiments. Further, Evidence was not 
recoverable from pagefile.sys in any of the scenarios. It can be argued that the 
reason is the relatively large RAM size installed in the host machine if compared to the 
short web browsing session; when the physical memory is exhausted, Windows 
compensates by virtually extending RAM space into the hard drive to create what is 
known as virtual memory, or a paging file, and moves inactive (but still needed) data to 
pagefile.sys. However, another reason as to why the value of the pagefile was very 
limited is that Windows, for security reasons, splits files moved from RAM to the page 
file into small chunks of data that can only be readable if mapped back in the right order 
to reconstruct the former state. (Al-Khateeb, 2014) 
 
Nevertheless, memory dumps showed some false (or irrelevant) evidence too. 
Youtube.com and google.com were found to appear over 100 times in most memory 
dumps. They were often found listed with other popular search engines or websites 
indicating that these results were populated from elsewhere such as default browser 
search URLs.  
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
From the results, the live memory dump held the most evidence of artefacts created 
during private and portable browsing sessions. Unfortunately capturing a live memory 
dump is not always possible when evidence is being recovered from a scene. It is also 
possible that doing so could alter original data and affect the forensic value of artefacts. 
The tests performed in these scenarios included far shorter browsing sessions than would 
be recovered from a system under daily use. Therefore, some of the evidence found in 
live memory is possibly recoverable from pagefile.sys or hiberfile.sys even 
if systems have been shut down. When a virtual environment is used, users can take 
snapshots of the running state of the system or suspend the active session and save 
everything including physical memory to a file, usually to one of the following formats: 
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.vmem or .vmss, these files are increasingly becoming a very rich resource to extract 
artefacts during digital investigations. 
 
 If suspects have been using IE InPrivate browsing mode in the hope of hiding 
browser activities, the results from tests have shown that the artefacts IE leaves on hard 
drives can lead to the sites and search terms which have been used. $I30 was a 
particularly useful file which had not been mentioned in previous studies on portable and 
private browser forensics and should be considered as an artefact which may contain 
evidence for browsers that were identified to store files on the hard drive during usage 
(Chrome Portable and IE InPrivate browsing). Firefox Portable, Chrome Portable 
Incognito, Opera Portable Private, and Firefox Portable Private browsing modes stored 
no artefacts on the system hard disk. With Firefox Portable, Chrome Portable and Opera 
portable normal browsing, many artefacts could be recovered from the USB stick. This 
demonstrates how important it is for forensic investigators to recover all devices from a 
scene, particularly as the USB stick may contain the sqlite databases containing 
detailed evidence of browsing history. 
 
 These tests have also shown that by default some web browsers leave URLs in 
their databases and in live memory when run before any browsing activity has occurred. 
In these tests, results for google.com and youtube.com were particularly prominent. 
Forensic investigators will therefore need to be extra vigilant when analysing browser 
artefacts to ensure that evidence was not placed by the browser.  
 
 The results outlined in this work show that evidence of web browsing sessions is 
recoverable from all systems regardless of whether portable or private browsing modes 
are in use in the most recent versions of Chrome, Firefox, Opera and IE. In all scenarios, 
artefacts were recoverable. Web browser claims that browsing history will not be 
recoverable in private modes may prevent an average computer user from finding 
evidence, but using forensic techniques plenty of evidence was recoverable which may 
prove to be crucial to a forensic investigation. It is also crucial for Internet users to learn 
that browsers security does not make them anonymous when their network is monitored 
by an Internet Service provider or a Network Administrator at the workplace. Similarly, 
spyware and key loggers can also violate their privacy if any of these malicious software 
is installed on their client machines.  
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